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In the early 1990s, Japanese equity prices fell drastically from heights
that are now considered the eﬀects of a stock market bubble. During the re-
mainder of the decade, the value of the stock market stabilized at much
lower values. Here, we examine the link between the liquidity of the Japan-
ese stock market and the macroeconomy in a period of prolonged deﬂa-
tion, slow growth, and near-zero interest rates.
Recent research has shown that the liquidity of major world ﬁnancial
markets substantially varied over time and that the unpredictability of
market liquidity is an important source of risk for investors. In this chap-
ter, we document a large and persistent decline in Japanese stock market
liquidity during the 1990s. In illiquid stock markets, investors are unable to
sell large amounts of shares without a sharp decline in the price of the
shares. We show that the impact of stock trading on share prices rose sub-
stantially after the collapse of the bubble. In addition, the volatility of liq-
uidity shocks to the stock market increased dramatically.
A number of factors have led to a decline in asset-market liquidity dur-
ing the late 1990s. First, Japanese ﬁnancial intermediaries experienced a
substantial deterioration in their balance sheets. If market makers and
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(Project No. HKUST6291/03H) and Hao Li for valuable research work.other investors faced credit constraints, this may have reduced their ability
to take advantage of high returns by providing liquidity to an illiquid mar-
ket. Second, during much of this period, Japan was operating in a deﬂa-
tionary environment in which savers were able to earn real returns simply
by holding money. This may have reduced their incentives to take specula-
tive risks by providing liquidity to the market. Third, adverse shocks to liq-
uidity in the world and East Asian ﬁnancial markets potentially increased
the exposure of Japanese ﬁrms. At the microstructure level, the Tokyo
Stock Exchange implements a continuous auction-based order system
in the late 1990s, dispensing with market makers (Tokyo Stock Exchange
2003).1
We consider some channels through which ﬁnancial market liquidity
shocks may aﬀect the macroeconomy. Naturally, a rise in equity risk tends
to raise the cost of capital of ﬁrms through the cost of ﬁnancing channel.
Using cross-sectional data, we ﬁnd that exposure to liquidity risk is an im-
portant determinant of investment. Another channel pertains to the eﬀects
of shocks on the portfolio of assets. Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) construct
a theory in which liquid assets are held primarily as a hedge against the
illiquidity of real assets. A rise in money held for ﬁnancial liquidity may re-
duce money available for transactions. In an economy with nominal rigidi-
ties, an increase in money demand can have real eﬀects on the economy.
Nagayasu (2003) ﬁnds evidence of a structural break in money demand in
Japan during the crisis. Indeed there is a sharp decline in the velocity of
money in the late 1990s. We ﬁnd, using time-series data, that shocks to ﬁ-
nancial market liquidity have eﬀects on the economy, which are similar to
textbook eﬀects of money demand shocks.
In measuring stock market liquidity, we closely follow Pastor and Stam-
baugh’s (2003) measure of United States equity market liquidity. They
measure liquidity by the degree to which the quantity of stocks traded
aﬀects the market price of stocks. In a liquid market, large sales of stocks
can be made without substantially changing the price of the stocks. In an
illiquid market, however, they can have an adverse impact on stock prices.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is an early study of the relationship be-
tween market liquidity and stock returns. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang
(1993) construct a model in which risk-averse market makers require a
premium to buy large quantities of stock. Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrah-
manyam (2002) ﬁnd that aggregate liquidity ﬂuctuations in the United
States aﬀect both bond and stock markets and are correlated with mone-
tary policy. Stahel (2004) ﬁnds that global liquidity shocks aﬀect stock
markets in both the United States and Japan. Hamao, Mei, and Xu (2003)
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1. Buy and sell orders are matched ﬁrst according to price (highest buy to lowest sell oﬀer)
and second by time of placement. Also, important features of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in-
clude the intraday price limit rule and limit-order trading—for the institutional features of
trading, see, for example, Ahn et al. (2002).ﬁnd a dramatic decrease in trading volumes in the Japanese stock market
after the bubble burst.
Section 8.2 describes the technique for measuring stock market liquidity
and some of the time-series properties of market liquidity shocks. We ﬁnd
that, during the 1990s, stock market liquidity fell, and the volatility of liq-
uidity shocks increased. Moreover, the exposure of individual ﬁrms’ equity
shares to liquidity shocks rose during the same period. Section 8.3 presents
some ﬁrm-level cross-sectional determinants of liquidity risk and the real
impact of exposures to liquidity risk. We ﬁnd that the liquidity of individ-
ual corporate balance sheets predicts how exposed their shares will be to
liquidity shocks. Moreover, exposures to liquidity shocks help determine
the capital growth and sales growth of ﬁrms during the crisis. In Section
8.4, we examine the dynamic interaction between stock market liquidity
and the macroeconomy using vector autoregressions (VARs). An exami-
nation of money markets suggests that a decline in stock market liquidity
leads to a rise in the demand for real money balances. Section 8.5 con-
cludes. The data used are described in an appendix.
8.2 Measure of Liquidity Risk
8.2.1 Measuring Stock Market Liquidity
In measuring Japanese aggregate stock market liquidity, we closely fol-
low Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) measure for the United States equity
markets. For a group of Japanese common shares indexed by k, we estimate
the eﬀect of order ﬂows on excess daily returns for each month from Jan-
uary 1975 to December 2001. Using time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS), we estimate the following equation:
(1) rxs
k,d,t    0
k,t    1
k,t   r k,d 1,t    2
k,t   sign(rxs
k,d 1,t)   volk,d 1,t   εk,d,t,
where r k,d,t is the return on the stock of company k on day d of month t. De-
ﬁne rd,t
MKT as the equal-weighted return on Japanese stocks in the Paciﬁc
Capital Markets (PACAP) database (see the appendix). The excess return
rxs
k,d,t   r k,d,t – rd,t
MKTis measured as the diﬀerence between the return on stock
k and the market return. The sign(rxs
k,d–1,t) variable is equal to 1 when lagged
excess returns are positive and equal to –1 when lagged excess returns are
negative. We deﬁne volk,d,t as the value of shares traded, measured in bil-
lions of yen. The signing of the trading volume is meant to distinguish
whether trades are driven by selling pressure from investors or by buying
pressure. When investors are selling shares in a company to market makers
or other short-term liquidity providers, such as speculators, excess returns
on that company should be negative. When investors are buying from mar-
ket makers, excess returns should be positive. The lagged return is included
to capture inertia eﬀects that are not volume related.
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k,t measures the degree to which sales aﬀect returns and
thus might be thought of as a measure of liquidity in that particular mar-
ket. One would expect  2
k,tto be negative in general and more negative when
liquidity is lower. This idea is rooted in Campbell, Grossman, and Wang’s
model (1993) in which a large value of shares traded generates reversals in
returns in illiquid markets.2 In their model, risk-averse market makers de-
mand higher than expected returns to buy or sell a large volume of shares.
When there are large sales at day d – 1, the market makers oﬀer a relatively
low price, generating negative excess returns in period d – 1 and predicting
relatively high returns in the subsequent period. Under this theory, trad-
ing volume should be associated with return reversals, if the stock is not
perfectly liquid. Technically, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Tokyo Stock Ex-
change 2003) does not operate on a system in which speciﬁed market mak-
ers are responsible for the trading of individual stocks. The Campbell,
Grossman, and Wang theory can apply more generally to a case in which
there are a limited number of investors willing and able to engage in short-
term speculation in individual stocks. It is therefore interesting to see
whether the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) model captures some features
of market liquidity in a market without market makers.
We estimate  2
k,tfor each stock-month for which there are at least nine us-
able observations during the month and for which both the previous month
and the subsequent month have at least nine usable observations. To ob-
tain a consistent sample of ﬁrms during the 1990s, we choose from the
PACAP database a set of 828 nonﬁnancial ﬁrms for which we are able to
estimate  2
k,t for at least 140 of the 144 months between January 1990 and
December 2001, and for which we can obtain balance-sheet data (from the
same source) in years 1990, 1995, and 2000. To avoid contaminating the
sample with the results of buyouts or bankruptcies, we exclude ﬁrms whose
equity permanently ceases trading at some point.
Panel A of ﬁgure 8.1 shows the number of shares, Nt, for which we are
able to estimate the eﬀect of trading value on returns for each month for
the period between January 1975 and December 2001. We begin with ap-
proximately 500 diﬀerent shares, a number that grows with time. By con-
struction, the number of ﬁrms after 1989 is approximately constant. (Other
panels of the ﬁgure will be discussed later.)
8.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Aggregate Stock Market
Table 8.1also shows some properties of the shares of our sample in com-
parison with a broader index of stocks from PACAP. The equal-weighted
average monthly return (excluding dividends) for shares in the overall
sample of ﬁrms is about 0.8 percent per month; in our smaller sample, the
312 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cook
2. Chao and Hueng (forthcoming) show that return reversals are a prevalent phenomenon
of the Japanese stock market.Fig. 8.1 Time-series liquidity measures
Notes:The ﬁgure shows the details of aggregate market liquidity. Panels A and B show the de-
tails of the sample of ﬁrms including the number of ﬁrms in the sample observed in any pe-
riod and the market capitalization of those ﬁrms. Panel C shows the aggregate market liquid-
ity measure, LIQ,which essentially is the average cost, in terms of returns, of trading 1 billion
of 2001 yen. Panel D shows the conditional heteroscedasticity of shocks to an AR(2) process





Baverage return is slightly smaller at 0.6 percent per month. We will focus on
two subperiods: the early 1990s (January 1990–December 1995) and the
late 1990s (January 1996–December 2001). In both the early and late 1990s,
mean returns are negative and slightly lower for the large sample than for
our narrower sample. This may not be surprising since our sample drops
those shares that stop trading at some point during the 1990s. In all sub-
periods, the standard deviation of the equal-weighted monthly returns in
our sample is similar to that in the PACAP sample. The volatility of returns
increases during the 1990s in both samples and is largest during the early
1990s.
8.2.3 Dissecting Changes in Market Turnover
To  access stock market liquidity, we compare the average monthly
turnover of the shares of our sample, relative to the turnover of the stocks
measured in the Topix index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Turnover is de-
ﬁned as the value of shares traded in a month as percentage of end-of-
period market capitalization (bottom rows of table 8.1). In the whole pe-
riod, about 4 percent of the value of shares in the Topix index is traded in
the average month. Our sample is slightly more liquid with about 5 percent
of the value traded. While turnover is slightly higher in our sample than the
Topix sample in both subperiods, it is lower in the early and late 1990s than
in the entire period in both samples.
Given the overall decline in market liquidity, we look more closely at
which investors left the market. Figure 8.2 shows the path, from 1988 to
2001, of average monthly purchases of stocks (relative to overall market
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Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics of stock market aggregates (%)
Entire period Early 1990s Late 1990s
(January, 1975– (January, 1990– (January, 1996–
December 2001) December, 1995) December, 2001)
Mean return
PACAP index rMKT 0.80 –0.37 –0.55
Our sample 0.61 –0.28 –0.49
Standard deviation of market return
PACAP index 5.90 8.04 6.97
Our sample 5.74 8.67 7.38
Monthly turnover
TOPIX 4.38 2.19 3.22
Our sample 5.08 3.38 3.62
Notes: This table characterizes some of the statistical properties of time series from the Japa-
nese stock markets. We compute the mean and standard deviation of returns from an equal-
weighted index calculated by PACAP and those from an equal-weighted average of our
sample of ﬁrms. We also compare the turnover (ratio of monthly value traded to market cap-
italization) for the Tokyo Stock Exchange and our sample of ﬁrms.capitalization) by investors trading for their proprietary accounts and by
three other types of investors trading through brokerages. The three types
include domestic individuals, domestic ﬁnancial institutions, and foreign
traders. All trading is reported relative to the aggregate market capitaliza-
tion. Purchases by foreign traders grew throughout the period, while trad-
ing by all three types of domestic investors initially declined following the
burst of the stock market bubble. Over the course of the 1990s, trading on
proprietary accounts recovered. However, trading through brokerages by
individuals and institutions persistently declined during the ﬁrst half of the
period. In particular, by the end of the period the share traded by domes-
tic institutions had fallen to less than half of its initial level.3
8.2.4 Properties of the Liquidity Measure
The aggregate measure of the market value, mt, of the shares for which
we are able to calculate  2
k,t is given by
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Fig. 8.2 Purchases of shares by type of investor
Notes: The ﬁgure shows Tokyo Stock Exchange data on the quantity of shares purchased by
four types of investors relative to aggregate market capitalization. Data reported are yearly
averages of monthly data.
3. Wang (2003) shows that institutional participation is a signiﬁcant determinant of mar-
ket liquidity in the United States.where mktcapk,t is the end-of-month market capitalization of stock k in
month t, and Nt is the number of shares in month t. Panel A of ﬁgure 8.1
shows the average market capitalization mt/Nt during each period. In the
mid-1970s, the average ﬁrm in the sample had a market capitalization of
approximately 45 billion yen. During the 1970s and 1980s, average market
capitalization grew rapidly to a peak of nearly 500 billion yen in late 1989
before falling rapidly to a level near 200 billion yen. During the 1990s, av-
erage market capitalization ﬂuctuated between 200 and 300 billion yen.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyan (2002) ﬁnd that average market liq-
uidity in the United States (as measured by bid-ask spreads) shows sub-
stantial variation over time. Following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), we
measure average market liquidity, LIQt, as follows:
LIQt     .
We average the liquidity parameter across the ﬁrms with usable obser-
vations in a particular month t. The parameter measures the eﬀect of a bil-
lion yen trading on stock returns. To reﬂect the growth in size of the stock
market over time, the average of  2
k,t across ﬁrms is multiplied by the ratio
of the sum of the market capitalization of the ﬁrms to the market capital-
ization at a ﬁxed date, December 2001.
Panel C of ﬁgure 8.1 shows the time path of LIQt. The aggregate market
liquidity is negative in most of the time, suggesting—in accordance with
theory—that heavy trading results in return reversals due to illiquidity.
Further, aggregate market liquidity varies substantially. Table 8.2 (part A)
shows that the mean level of liquidity is –0.014 so that sales of 1 billion yen
(roughly in 2001 yen) result in expected returns of 1.4 percent in a month.
The market became less liquid over time, and the average level of LIQt fell
to –0.02 in the early 1990s and fell further to below –0.04 by the late 1990s,
approximately twice the entire period mean. A simple Chow breakpoint
test at January 1996 rejects the stability of the mean at any reasonable crit-
ical value. However, an Adjusted Dickey-Fuller test with twelve lags rejects
the hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 percent critical value (regardless of
whether a deterministic trend term is included). Although Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) document substantial and persistent variations in the
U.S. equity market, such variations do not involve so prolonged a liquidity
drought as observed in the Japanese market in the late 1990s.
Panel E of ﬁgure 8.1 shows more closely the time series of aggregate mar-
ket liquidity over the period 1996–2001 (essentially a close-up of panel C of
ﬁgure 8.1). Over this period, market liquidity seems to reﬂect a response to
both national and international events. Perhaps coincidentally, in the peri-
ods following the November 1996 announcement of the “Big Bang” market
∑
Nt







316 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cookliberalization, there was a persistent decline in market liquidity, followed by
a recovery over the summer of 1997. However, in November 1997, market
liquidity suddenly plunged to a level dramatically lower than that observed
in any prior period. This episode coincides with major turmoil in the Japan-
ese ﬁnancial system (as well as the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis) since a num-
ber of intermediaries including the fourth largest securities ﬁrm (Yamaichi
Securities) and one of the city banks (Hokkaido Takushoku) were forced
into bankruptcy. This low level of liquidity persisted through 1998, includ-
ing a negative spike in September coincident with the Russian crisis and the
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).4
Liquidity recovered to more normal levels through 1999. However, a
new persistent decline in liquidity occurred in November 1999 and was
punctuated by a number of periods in which liquidity increased rapidly but
temporarily. In one of these periods, January 2000, liquidity reached a level
much higher than previously observed. During the turn of the millennium
period, the level of bank reserves held at the Bank of Japan also spiked.
We observe another sharp decline in liquidity after September 2001, de-
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Table 8.2 Liquidity measure and liquidity beta
Entire period Early 1990s Late 1990s
(January, 1975– (January, 1990– (January, 1996–
December, 2001) December, 1995) December, 2001)
A. Liquidity measure
Mean –0.0143 –0.0200 –0.0401
Shock volatility 0.0147 0.0102 0.0274
Correlation w/ PACAP index 0.268 0.424 0.252
Covariance w/ PACAP index 0.000226 0.000342 0.000425
B. Liquidity beta
Mean — 1.573 0.536
Standard deviation — 1.150 0.567
Percent ﬁrms with 
signiﬁcant t-statistics 32.6 27.3
Notes: Part A characterizes the mean and standard deviation of our measure of market liq-
uidity, LIQ, as well as its correlation and covariance with the PACAP equal-weighted index.
Part B characterizes the cross-sectional distribution of the partial betas from regressions 
of individual stock returns on the aggregate index and liquidity shocks. The characterization
includes mean and cross-section standard deviation of the coefﬁcient on liquidity shocks
as well as the percentage of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant t-statistics based on Newey and West’s
heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
4. Crises can be internationally transmitted through diverse channels. In particular, a crisis
in one market causes institutional investors to sell liquid assets in other markets to meet reg-
ulator requirements (a forced-portfolio recomposition eﬀect). Forbes (2000), using ﬁrm-level
cross-country data, shows that individual company’s stock market returns are aﬀected by
global trading liquidity during the East Asian and Russian crises through a forced-portfolio
recomposition.spite that Japan has undergone reforms to liberalize its ﬁnancial markets in
ways that may allow the additional participation of external investors and
institutions. Persaud (2000), however, argues that the common use of mod-
ern risk-management practices leads to herding behavior that may reduce
market liquidity despite a large number of market participants. Also, such
a decline in liquidity might be associated with heightened perceptions of
risk after the 9/11 terrorist attack.
8.2.5 Robust Measures
We  also examine some alternative measures of liquidity. Figure 8.3
(panel A) shows the pattern of Σk
Nt  2
k,t/Nt, which is unadjusted for changes
in market capitalization over time. According to this measure, the impact
of trading a billion yen worth of shares from the mid- to the late seventies
was indeed very large and comparable with more recent periods. However,
during the 1980s, return reversals associated with large stock sales became
318 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cook
Fig. 8.3 Alternative liquidity measures
Notes: Panel A shows the average liquidity in terms of return of trading a billion yen in cur-
rent currency units (i.e., unadjusted for changes in aggregate market capitalization). Panel B
shows the average liquidity using a sample of all available ﬁrms including those that joined or
left the sample during the 1990s. Panel C shows the average liquidity of a group of ﬁrms that
were observed for the entire twenty-seven year period between 1975 and 2001. Panel D shows
the weighted (by market capitalization) average liquidity of the sample.
C
A B
Dmuch smaller, beginning to rise dramatically again in the 1990s just as in
the benchmark series, LIQ.
Panels B and C show alternative measures of LIQt for diﬀerent sets of
ﬁrms. Panel B pertains to the set of ﬁrms that includes all of the nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms available in which an estimate of  2
k,t is available in that time
period. The number of ﬁrms ranges from about 500 in 1975 to about 1,400
by 2001. The measure of liquidity with this broad set of ﬁrms shows a sim-
ilar pattern, compared to our benchmark measure of liquidity. During
the 1970s and 1980s, stock market liquidity was relatively high. During the
1990s, the aggregate liquidity began to fall. After 1997, stock market liq-
uidity on average dropped dramatically and the volatility of liquidity rose.
Panel C depicts a liquidity measure deﬁned by the average  2
k,t (weighted
across time by aggregate market capitalization) of a group of approxi-
mately 370 ﬁrms for which we are able to measure liquidity for at least 320
out of the 324 months in the years between 1975 and 2001. This measure of
liquidity shows again a similar path with a fall in liquidity in the 1990s and
a more dramatic decline after 1997 along with an increase in volatility of
liquidity. The average level of liquidity of this group of more established
companies was higher than that of the broader sample.
Finally, panel D displays a weighted average of  2
k,t with the weight for
each ﬁrm being the end-of-month market capitalization. This measure
shows the same pattern as the other measures with a marked drop in liq-
uidity in the 1990s. In the weighted average, the size of return reversals is
smaller, indicating that big-cap stocks are more liquid.
8.2.6 Measuring of Shocks to Market Liquidity
A measure of innovations to liquidity is the adjusted average of innova-
tions to the liquidity of each ﬁrm:
 LIQt    .
Aggregate liquidity shocks are estimated as innovations to the following
dynamic process:
 LIQt    0    1    LIQt 1    2   LIQt 1    t,
where the predicted change in liquidity depends on the lagged change and
the deviation of the lagged level from its long-run mean (impounded in  0).
The ﬁtted residuals are a measure of liquidity shocks:
lshockt    ˆ t.
Table 8.2 (part A) shows that the average standard deviation of liquidity
shocks varies from period to period. The standard deviation for the entire
sample is about 0.015. However, much of this volatility is concentrated in
∑
N t( 2






Stock Market Liquidity and the Macroeconomy 319the late 1990s, where the standard deviation is above 0.027 as compared
with that of 0.010 in the early 1990s.
We conduct a Breusch-Pagan LM test for conditional heteroscedasticity
on the residuals and reject conditional homoscedasticity with a p-value of
less than 10–4 using any number of lags between one and twelve. We esti-
mate a GARCH (1, 1) process for lshockt:
(3)  t
2   0.000   0.851  2
t 1   0.190 lshock2
t 1.
(0.000) (0.025) (0.030)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Panel D of ﬁgure 8.1 shows the ﬁtted value of the conditional variance of
the shock. The volatility of the liquidity shock increased sharply during the
early 1990s. Such a sharp rise was followed by a much larger rise in condi-
tional variance in 1998 and, ﬁnally, an even larger jump in 2000–2001.
We calculate the correlation between the PACAP equal-weighted stock
return, rt
MKT, and lshockt (part A of table 8.2). The correlation in the entire
period is about 0.27. During the early 1990s, the correlation between liq-
uidity shocks and aggregate stock returns was as high as 0.42 and fell to
0.25 in the late 1990s. However, despite the fall in correlation, the overall
exposure of ﬁrms’ shares to aggregate liquidity shocks rose over the decade
because of the increased variance of shocks. The covariance between the
aggregate return index and the liquidity shock was about 20 percent larger
in the late 1990s sample than in the early 1990s sample.
8.2.7 Liquidity Risk and Asset Pricing
To check if there is some relationship between liquidity risk exposure
and the average returns, we estimate a partial liquidity beta,  liquid
k,period, by re-
gressing the monthly excess return on the liquidity shock over the period
January 1990–December 1995.
(4) r k,t   it 1      MKT
k,period   (rt
MKT   it 1)    liquid
k,period   lshockt   ek,t,
where period is equal to the early 1990s or the late 1990s, r k,t is the monthly
return on stock k, and it is the collateralized overnight call money rate.
The average  liquid
k,90–95 across ﬁrms is about 1.6 while the average  liquid
k,96–01 is
slightly greater than 0.5 (part B of table 8.2). Note that the median is very
close to the mean for both ﬁgures. Although a given shock on returns has
a smaller eﬀect in the later period, the overall rise in the volatility of the liq-
uidity shock indicates that the partial covariance of the shock (measured
as the product of  liquid
k,period and the variance of lshockt) is higher in the later
period. Using Newey-West corrected, heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation
consistent standard errors, we ﬁnd that the percentages of ﬁrms that have
signiﬁcant exposures to the liquidity shocks at the 5 percent level in two sub-
periods are not much diﬀerent: about 33 percent of the ﬁrms have liquidity
320 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cookbeta’s which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the ﬁrst subperiod,
while approximately 27 percent of the ﬁrms do in the second subperiod.
8.2.8 Banking Risk and Liquidity Shocks
We examine the connection between liquidity shocks and banking risk.
Liquidity shocks may be the result of credit rationing, which prevents spec-
ulators from borrowing money that could be used to buy stocks. We can
measure banking risk by the premium that Japanese banks pay to borrow
from abroad. In the late 1990s, Japanese banks paid a premium to borrow
in euro markets. Ito and Harada (2000) show that this premium is con-
nected to incidents related to both the failures of Japanese ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and the excess returns on banking stocks. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) col-
lects data on the Japan premium from 1997. The Japan premium is per-
sistently high during 1997 and 1998, a period when stock market liquidity
is also persistently low.5
Table 8.3 summarizes the regression results for the relationship between
liquidity shocks, banking risk, and market returns. The estimated coeﬃ-
cient (along with Newey-West corrected standard errors) from a regression
of liquidity shocks, lshock, on the ﬁrst diﬀerence in the Japan premium,
 jpnprem, suggests that increases in the Japan premium are associated
with negative shocks to stock market liquidity (table 8.3, column 1). This
association is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. However, the adjusted R2
from the regression is less than 0.03, suggesting much of the variation in
liquidity shocks is not directly caused by the Japan premium.
To examine how liquidity shocks and the Japan premium are associated
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Table 8.3 Banking risk measure, liquidity shocks, and market returns
lshock rMKT rMKT rMKT
lshock 0.636*** 0.458**
(3.35) (2.13)
∆jpnprem –0.056*** –0.270*** –0.247***
(–2.67) (–4.29) (–3.53)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.052 0.141 0.161
Notes: Regression results with the PACAP equal-weighted stock index on liquidity shocks
and the change in the Japan premium. The Japan premium, as a measure of banking risk, is
deﬁned as the spread between the interest rate paid on dollar borrowing in the Japanese in-
terbank market and the rate paid on dollars in London. The coefﬁcient estimates are reported
with Newey-West’s heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation consistent t-values (in parentheses).
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
5. Banks whose credit ratings deteriorate upon adverse aggregate shocks may drop out of
the international interbank market. Such dropouts are positively correlated with country risk
and thus reﬂected in the measured Japan premium.with innovations to stock returns, we regress the PACAP equal-weighted
market return, rMKT, on lshock and  jpnprem over the period January
1997–December 2001. Positive innovations in liquidity are associated with
relatively high stock returns (column 2). The association is statistically sig-
niﬁcant in each case at the 1 percent level. Increases in the Japan premium
are signiﬁcantly (at the 1 percent level) negatively associated with stock
returns (column 3). Also, when we include both variables (column 4),
changes in the Japan premium are still signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The
eﬀect of the liquidity shock remains signiﬁcant for the equal-weighted re-
turn at the 5 percent level, even with the inclusion of the Japan premium.
8.3 Cross-Sectional Evidence on Market Liquidity and Growth
8.3.1 Firm-Level Variables and Descriptive Statistics
From PACAP, we extract additional ﬁrm-level variables that we consider
as factors to explain cross-sectional exposure to liquidity risk. Descriptive
statistics are reported in table 8.4. Additional information on the data used
in the chapter is provided in the appendix.
First, a large percentage of shares of the ﬁrms in our sample are owned
either by ﬁnancial institutions or by corporations. Shares with these kinds
of cross-holdings may be less liquid. We construct a variable: percentage of
stocks held by banks or corporate sector is the number of shares owned by ﬁ-
nancial institutions plus shares owned by other businesses divided by the to-
tal number of shares in 1995. In 1995, approximately two-thirds of the shares
of the mean and median ﬁrm are held by banks and other corporations.
Firms with high liquidity needs may be especially vulnerable to aggre-
gate liquidity shocks. We construct a variable to measure short-term debt
at the ﬁrm level: short-term loans to asset ratio is the measure of short-term
loans includes accounts and notes payable, short-term loans and paper (due
within one year), as well as the current portion of long-term bonds and
loans which are due within the year. Short-term loans are normalized by
dividing by total assets in 1995. These liabilities constitute approximately
30 percent of assets for the mean and median ﬁrm, though the number
ranges between 0 and nearly 95 percent.
To control for overall leverage, we include other kinds of liabilities: other
liabilities to asset ratioindicates the sum of all other liabilities relative to to-
tal assets in 1995. Other types of liabilities are approximately 30 percent of
assets for the mean and median ﬁrm and are on average equal in size to
short-term liabilities.
If a ﬁrm has more liquid assets, it will be less exposed to liquidity shocks.
However, ﬁnancially weak ﬁrms that do not have access to ﬁnancial mar-
kets will fear ﬁnancial strains caused by insuﬃcient reserves of liquidity
and thus try to hold more liquidity. Empirical studies with U.S. ﬁrm-level
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2002) suggest that high-information-cost ﬁrms hold comparatively larger
cash reserves than do other ﬁrms.6 Thus, controlling for the size and qual-
ity of ﬁrms, we examine if ﬁrms with more liquid assets are less exposed to
liquidity shocks. We construct a variable which measures ﬁrms’ liquidity
positions: liquid assets to assets ratio is the currency, bank deposits, and
marketable securities held by the ﬁrm relative to total assets in 1995. About
30 percent of the average ﬁrms’ assets are liquid. Naturally, this constitutes
a large range.
Since liquidity shocks may be less important for large ﬁrms, which have
better access to ﬁnancial markets, than for small ﬁrms, we also include an
asset variable as a proxy of ﬁrm size. Assetsdenotes the logarithm of the to-
tal assets (measured in millions of yen).
In addition, we include some additional balance-sheet measures to con-
trol for the overall quality of the ﬁrm. Financial to book value is the sum of
total liabilities plus market capitalization divided by total assets in 1995.
This measures the cost of purchasing the ﬁrm outright relative to the ac-
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Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics of ﬁrm-level variables
Variable Mean (SD) Median [Min, Max]
Percent of stocks held by banks or corporate sector 0.650
(0.115) 0.661 [0.086, 0.921]
Short-term debt to asset ratio 0.304
(0.17) 0.280 [0.000, 0.942]
Other liabilities to asset ratio 0.292
(0.146) 0.276 [0.016, 0.964]
Liquid assets to assets ratio 0.308
(0.181) 0.272 [0.019, 0.986]
Log of assets 11.990
(1.279) 11.862 [8.666, 16.44]
Financial value to book assets 1.471
(0.397) 1.393 [0.780, 6.042]
Return on equity 0.018
(0.152) 0.034 [–2.859, 0.460]
Growth in net ﬁxed assets (in log difference) 0.037
End of 1995 to end of 2001 (0.419) 0.030 [–3.573, 1.696]
Growth in sales (in log difference) –0.056
End of 1995 to end of 2001 (0.306) –0.041 [–2.961, 1.237]
Notes:The table summarizes the descriptive statistics for balance sheet data from PACAP for the period
1995–2001. We also report the growth in ﬁxed assets and sales between 1995 and 2001.
6. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) suggest that ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms’ liquid-
ity position is more sensitive to cash-ﬂow shocks, compared to ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms. This
reﬂects that ﬁnancially weak ﬁrms strive to accumulate reserves of liquidity to hedge against
liquidity risk while ﬁnancially strong ﬁrms can raise funds from ﬁnancial market in the event
of ﬁnancial strains.counting cost valuation of assets, which is considered as a proxy of Tobin’s
q-ratio. Return on equityindicates net income divided by book equity value
in 1995. The typical ﬁnancial-to-book value in the sample is approximately
1.4. The average return on equity in 1997 was approximately 4 percent but
the range is extremely large. Further, PACAP categorizes ﬁrms by sector at
the approximately one- or two-digit level. The appendix lists the sectors
and the number of ﬁrms in our sample that fall into these shares.
8.3.2 Determinants of the Liquidity Premium
To access the determinants of the liquidity exposure of individual ﬁrms
during the liquidity-trap period, we regress the partial liquidity beta,
 liquid
k,96–01, which is obtained from estimating equation (4) for January 1996–
December 2001, on our ﬁrm-level variables. We scale all coeﬃcients by
multiplying each by the ratio of the cross-sectional standard deviation of
that variable and dividing by the standard deviation of the dependent vari-
able,  liquid
k,96–01. The results are reported in table 8.5 (column 1), along with
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics.
In general, we ﬁnd evidence on the link between ﬁrms’ exposures to liq-
uidity shocks and liquidity in their equity markets or balance sheets. In-
dicators of equity-market liquidity are associated with less exposure to
liquidity shocks. We ﬁnd that large ﬁrms (in terms of assets) have less ex-
posure to liquidity shocks than small ﬁrms, and this is signiﬁcant at the 10
percent critical value. Firms whose shares are owned in large part by ﬁ-
nancial institutions, nonﬁnancial corporations, or the government also
have relatively high-risk exposure, though this is marginally insigniﬁcant at
the 10 percent critical value (p-value   0.102).
Perhaps more interestingly, ﬁrms with more liquid balance sheets are less
exposed to liquidity shocks, whereas ﬁrms with more short-term debt are
more exposed to the shocks. A one-standard-deviation increase in short-
term debt is signiﬁcantly associated (at the 1 percent level) with an increase
in liquidity exposure equal to 14.3 percent of a standard deviation. By
comparison, a one-standard-deviation increase in longer-term liabilities
relative to assets is associated with an increase in liquidity exposure of 5
percent of a standard deviation. This association, however, is not signiﬁ-
cant at even the 10 percent level. Further, ﬁrms with large holdings of liq-
uid assets are less sensitive to liquidity shocks. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the liquid assets to assets ratio will reduce partial liquidity ex-
posure by 8 percent of a standard error: this relationship is signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. The positive link between corporate balance-sheet liq-
uidity and stock market liquidity perhaps indicates that stock market
liquidity shocks occur simultaneously with broader shocks to liquidity in
the economy including credit markets.
Higher quality ﬁrms have less exposure to liquidity shocks. Firms with
high ﬁnancial value relative to book value and ﬁrms that earn high proﬁts
324 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cookrelative to book equity have signiﬁcantly less exposure to liquidity shocks.
These relationships are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent and 5 per-
cent critical value, respectively. Overall, the regression has an R2 of about
17 percent.
8.3.3 Liquidity Exposure and Growth
To examine the relationship between liquidity exposure and ﬁrm growth,
we ﬁrst measure the growth of a ﬁrm in terms of capital investment. Growth
in net ﬁxed assets is the logarithm of the ratio of net ﬁxed assets in 2000 to
net ﬁxed assets in 1995. Over ﬁve years from 1995 to 2001, our sample ﬁrms
grew at 3.7 percent (an annual growth of about 0.7 percent) in net ﬁxed as-
sets. The cross-sectional variation of ﬁxed-asset growth is large with a stan-
dard deviation of almost 40 percent.
We also measure real growth in sales. The variable growth in sales is the
logarithm of sales in 2000 relative to sales in 1995. Sales declined during the
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Table 8.5 Firm-level regressions (end of 1995 to end of 2001)
Partial Liquidity Percent growth in Percent growth
Firm Characteristics Beta βliquid
k,96–01 net ﬁxed assets in sales
Partial liquidity beta: βliquid
k,96–01 –0.130*** –0.144***
(–2.61) (–4.89)
Percent of stocks held by banks or 0.061 0.020 0.015
corporate sector (1.64) (0.48) (0.55)
Short-term debt to asset ratio 0.143*** –0.052 –0.288***
(2.77) (–0.90) (–6.34)
Other liabilities to asset ratio 0.050 –0.076 –0.093**
(0.93) (–1.49) (–2.28)
Liquid assets to assets ratio –0.083** 0.002 –0.086**
(–2.04) (0.05) (–2.07)
Log of assets –0.079* –0.029 –0.024
(–1.89) (–0.63) (–0.68)
Financial value to book assets –0.083* 0.081 0.082**
(–1.85) (1.25) (2.20)
Return on equity –0.115** 0.077 0.123*
(–2.49) (1.12) (1.80)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 774 773 772
R2 0.167 0.084 0.272
Notes: The table reports the coefﬁcient estimates of the regressions of measures of exposure to liquidity
risk and performance on ﬁrm characteristics. All variables have been scaled by their cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation so that the coefﬁcient represents the impact (as a share of one standard deviation of the
left-hand side variable) of a one-standard-deviation increase in each right-hand side variable. Also re-
ported are heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.period by almost –1 percent on annual average. Again, there is large cross-
sectional variation in this measure with a standard deviation of over 30
percent.
In table 8.5 (columns 2 and 3), we regress measures of ﬁrm growth on liq-
uidity exposure and other ﬁrm-level characteristics (as well as some indus-
try dummies). The measure of liquidity exposure is the partial liquidity
beta from the late 1990s period,  liquid
k,96 01. The additional ﬁrm characteristics
are those listed in the previous section. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that have high
liquidity exposure also have statistically signiﬁcantly (at the 1 percent crit-
ical value) slower capital growth. One standard deviation higher in liquid-
ity exposure is associated with 13 percent of a standard deviation decline
in capital growth (which is approximately 1 percent lower ﬁxed-investment
growth per year). None of the other ﬁrm-level characteristics are signiﬁ-
cant at even the 10 percent critical value.
Firms with high liquidity exposures also tend to have lower sales growth.
A one-standard-deviation increase in liquidity exposure is statistically
signiﬁcantly associated (at the 1 percent critical value) with a 15 percent 
of standard deviation decrease in sales growth (approximately 1 percent
lower annual growth in sales). Variables related to market liquidity, such as
size and shares cross held, are not signiﬁcant. However, overall high lever-
age levels and, especially, high short-term debt are associated with slow
sales growth. A one-standard-deviation increase in the short-term debt to
asset ratio is signiﬁcantly associated (at the 1 percent critical value) with a
near 30 percent of a standard deviation lower level of sales growth (ap-
proximately 3 percent annual lower sales growth). Other liabilities relative
to assets are also signiﬁcantly associated with slow sales growth, though
the eﬀect is smaller quantitatively. Interestingly, ﬁrms with a high liquid as-
sets to total assets ratio in 1995 have statistically signiﬁcantly (at the 5 per-
cent critical value) slower subsequent sales growth. This result perhaps re-
ﬂects that holding liquid assets to hedge against liquidity risk is costly and
that such a precautionary liquidity holding may postpone or hinder in-
vestment and production for sales. A high market-to-book valuation of as-
sets ratio signiﬁcantly (at the 5 percent level) predicts subsequent sales
growth, and a high return on equity in 1995 also signiﬁcantly (at the 10 per-
cent level) predicts subsequent sales growth.
8.4 Time-Series Evidence on Market Liquidity and the Macroeconomy:
Vector Autoregression (VAR)
Monetary assets are part of larger portfolios of assets. Agents may hold
more liquid assets as a hedge when the liquidity risk of interest- or divi-
dend-paying assets rises. In Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), money is held en-
tirely as a hedge against the illiquidity of real assets. An increase in money
demand might lead to less liquidity available for the purchase of goods
326 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cookand, as in standard IS-LM analysis, lead to a decline in economic activity.
Thus, one may propose that a negative shock to market liquidity increases
money demand and aﬀects adversely economic activity.
To assess this proposition, we estimate a dynamic system with a VAR
with terms for real shocks, money-demand shocks, and money-supply
shocks during the post-bubble period (1990–2001). We use an economic
activity/production index, yt, for all sectors of the economy (excepting
agriculture) as a measure of real activity. Ueda (1993) argues that Japanese
monetary policy targets the call money rate, and Miyao (1996, 2002) de-
scribes the call money rate as the operating target of the Bank of Japan
during the period under consideration. We include the uncollateralized
overnight call money rate, callt. We use broad real-money balances as a
proxy for real-money demand. Speciﬁcally, the variable, mpt, is the loga-
rithm of the ratio of M2 plus CDs—which Ito (1994) reports as the most
commonly used broad money aggregate for Japan—divided by the core
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (i.e., CPI not including food and energy).
Sekine (1998) argues that ﬁnancial wealth is a determinant of money de-
mand. We include the log of the Topix stock market index, topix, as a proxy
for wealth and to control for the eﬀects of stock market return shocks on
market liquidity. This may be important as Bayoumi (2001) has shown that
shocks to asset prices have substantial real eﬀects on the Japanese econ-
omy during this period.
Since the stock market does not display much in the way of secular
growth during the post-bubble period, we measure the level of liquidity as
the simple average of the response of returns to signed trading volume:
(5) liquidityt  ∑
Nt
k 1
We do not multiply this liquidity measure by the aggregate market capital-
ization that may have macroeconomic eﬀects separate from ﬁnancial liq-
uidity. The time series for liquidity is shown in the ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 8.3.
We ﬁrst conduct Adjusted Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on each of the
variables to assess for unit roots. Using a speciﬁcation with four lags and
including a trend term, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root at the 10 percent level for any of the variables with the exception of liq-
uidity, for which the null hypothesis is rejected at any reasonable critical
value. Using the Johansen trace statistic in a speciﬁcation with four lags
and a trend term, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that y, mp, or call is
cointegrated with topix. We therefore estimate the VAR in a level speciﬁ-
cation.
We estimate a VAR in [y, call, mp, liquidity, topix] with twelve lags, a
trend term, and a dummy variable for January 2000, the millennium period
with the anomalously large, positive liquidity realization. The Akaike In-
formation Criterion indicates a second order VAR. However, this strikes us
 k,t  
Nt
Stock Market Liquidity and the Macroeconomy 327as too few lags to capture the dynamics of the monthly system.7Instead, we
estimate the VAR with twelve lags, which may be fairly typical for the VAR
estimation with monthly data.
We identify shocks to the system using the Choleski decomposition, in-
terpreting them as, in order: real output shocks, money-supply shocks,
money-demand shocks, liquidity shocks, and stock-price shocks. Ordering
the variables in this way, [y, call, mp, liquidity, topix], implies a number of
identifying assumptions about the short-run dynamics of the model. We
assume each of the shocks could have immediate eﬀects on the price of the
stock market. In particular, this ordering implies that innovations in the ag-
gregate price of stocks have no immediate impact on stock market liquid-
ity. However, we do allow market liquidity to respond immediately to all
macroeconomic shocks. Following Miyao (2002), we treat exogenous in-
novations in the call money rate as monetary-policy shocks and allow the
call money rate to respond immediately to real output shocks. Also, we al-
low money demand to respond immediately to output and the interest rate.
However, real output responds only with a lag to monetary-policy shocks.
Figure 8.4displays all of the impulse responses along with two standard-
error bands. However, we concentrate on discussing the eﬀects of liquidity
shocks on the macroeconomic variables and the eﬀects of various shocks
on stock market liquidity. We ﬁnd that liquidity shocks signiﬁcantly aﬀect
macroeconomic variables. Liquidity shocks aﬀect output in the real econ-
omy, but the impact of stock market liquidity on the economic activity in-
dex is small and short-lived. A one-standard-deviation increase in liquid-
ity results in an initial increase in output of about 0.2 percent. After one
period, the increase in output is not statistically signiﬁcant at even the 10
percent level. Liquidity shocks never explain more than 7 percent of vari-
ation in y at any frequency.
Liquidity shocks have persistent and statistically signiﬁcant impacts on
real balances. A positive shock to stock market liquidity leads to a reduc-
tion in the demand for more liquid real balances. Indeed, variance decom-
position shows that liquidity shocks explain more than 16 percent of the
variation in real balances at a frequency of eighteen months. Liquidity
shocks have macroeconomic eﬀects which are consistent with persistent
money-demand shocks. A positive liquidity shock also leads to a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant decline in (nominal) interest rates, consistent with the re-
duced money demand after the shock. However, the eﬀects of liquidity
shocks on asset markets themselves seem more transitory. Liquidity shocks
have very short-lived eﬀects on the stock market index, topix, reverting to
mean after a couple of periods.
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7. In particular, a very low-order VAR suggests that liquidity shocks have fairly large and
persistent eﬀects on output and real balances. In such a low-order VAR, macroeconomic


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Next, we ﬁnd that market liquidity is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by shocks to
output and topix but not by shocks to money-market variables, call rates,
and real balances. Shocks to topix have a short-lived impact on stock mar-
ket liquidity, suggesting that a rise in the stock price index attracts liquid-
ity to the stock market at least temporarily. Shocks to economic activity
also have signiﬁcant impacts on stock market liquidity. A positive innova-
tion in yleads to a persistent increase in topix and an increase in stock mar-
ket liquidity that persists for about six months. At the eighteen month fre-
quency, about 20 percent of the variation in stock market liquidity comes
from shocks to y. However, neither shocks to call rates nor shocks to real
balances have signiﬁcant eﬀects on stock market liquidity, while liquidity
shocks signiﬁcantly aﬀect both call rates and real balances: in essence, the
liquidity shocks could be thought of as general liquidity preference shocks
which feed into money and asset markets.
We are also interested in the response of the nominal money supply to
stock market liquidity shocks. To look at the response of narrow money, we
deﬁne mbase as the natural log of the monetary base; to look at broad
money, we deﬁne m2 as the log of M2 plus CDs. We estimate VARs in [y,
call, mbase, liquidity, topix] and [y, call, m2, liquidity, topix] with twelve
lags, a trend term, and a millennium dummy. Figure 8.5depicts the impulse
responses of the monetary aggregates to a one standard-deviation shock
along with two standard-error bands. There seems to be a qualitative
diﬀerence. The amount of banks’ reserves held after a positive liquidity
shock declines sharply and immediately. However, after just one period,
the supply of reserves returns to the preshock level. By contrast, the posi-
tive liquidity shock leads to a reduction in the demand for M2 that occurs
much more slowly but more persistently. Interpreted as a persistent decline
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Fig. 8.5 Money and interest rate responses
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the responses (along with two standard-error bands) of two mone-
tary aggregates to identiﬁed stock market liquidity shocks. The monetary aggregates are the
monetary base, mbase, and M2 plus CDs, m2. Shocks are identiﬁed using VARs with twelve
lags, a trend, and a millennium dummy.in money demand that occurs due to a decrease in asset-market liquidity
risk, which is not fully accommodated by a reduction in the monetary base,
this could explain why the interest rates in interbank lending markets fall
persistently following a liquidity shock.
8.5 Conclusions
We ﬁnd evidence that during the recent deﬂationary period, Japanese
equity markets were highly illiquid and subject to increasingly volatile liq-
uidity shocks. Our intention in this chapter is to show some of the causes
of this decline in liquidity as well as some of the interactions between stock
market liquidity and the macroeconomy.
Financial market evidence suggests that these liquidity shocks aﬀected the
equity returns of ﬁrms during the slump that followed the bursting of Japan’s
late–1980s bubble. We ﬁnd cross-sectional evidence that ﬁrms with illiquid
balance sheets and illiquid markets for their equity were more exposed to
these shocks and that this exposure was a predictor of the performance of the
ﬁrms during this period. We interpret the high exposure to equity liquidity
shocks of ﬁrms with high short-term debt as indicating that the liquidity
shocks to the stock market were also correlated with liquidity shocks in
broader ﬁnancial markets, including credit markets. This interpretation is
supported by time-series evidence that liquidity shocks have even more per-
sistent eﬀects on money demand than on equity market prices.
Using aggregate market liquidity, we ﬁnd evidence that liquidity shocks
in the Japanese stock market are associated with some macroeconomic
events. Large declines in liquidity occurred simultaneously with interna-
tional ﬁnancial shocks, such as those that occurred in September 1998 and
September 2001. Exogenous liquidity shocks seem to have a persistent neg-
ative eﬀect on money demand and interest rates, as well as some short-term
eﬀects on output. Time-series evidence also shows that the large initial de-
clines in liquidity occurred simultaneously with a wave of bankruptcies of
Japanese ﬁnancial intermediaries, including ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Statistically,
the Japan premium (i.e., the extra cost of short-term borrowing imposed
on Japanese banks) is strongly associated with stock market liquidity. In
general, exogenous negative-business-cycle shocks reduced stock market
liquidity. Stabilizing aggregate demand in the face of such a liquidity shock
may require the monetary authority to reduce interest rates. Since 1999,
Japanese monetary policy has been characterized by zero interest rates, the
lower bound that prevents the full accommodation of liquidity shocks. The
policy of quantitative easing undertaken by the Bank of Japan since March
2001, which led to an unprecedented high level of current account bal-
ances, may have provided ample reserves to the ﬁnancial sector. However,
such a measure was not promptly transmitted into the expansion of lend-
Stock Market Liquidity and the Macroeconomy 331ing and broad money (M2   CDs) enough to stimulate the economy and
to reverse lowered stock market liquidity.8
Since interest rates cannot fall below zero, whether or not the monetary
authorities can provide an additional stimulus to the economy remains in
question. Securities investors suﬃciently averse to liquidity risk may avoid
holding potentially illiquid stocks even at zero interest rates. However, if se-
curities ﬁrms or other market makers are facing credit constraints due to
problems in the banking sector, the direct provision of short-term loans to
securities companies or securities ﬁnance companies may enhance stock
market liquidity. Direct purchasing of the bills of ﬁnancial institutions is
one of the monetary-policy instruments available to the Bank of Japan (see
Bank of Japan 2002). It has long been recognized that providing liquidity to
ﬁnancial markets during panics is an important part of central bank man-
agement. In the environment faced by Japan over the last decade, with a
persistently illiquid market buﬀeted by volatile liquidity shocks, a more sys-
tematic provision of liquidity to equity markets may oﬀer substantial bene-
ﬁts. Though systematically providing liquidity to the stock market may not
overcome all of the risks faced by ﬁrms with illiquid balance sheets, en-
hancing stock market liquidity and reducing liquidity risk faced by in-
vestors could reduce the cost of equity capital in future fund raising (see,
e.g., Lerner and Schoar 2004) and promote ﬁrm-level growth. However, it
should be cautioned that a commitment to providing liquidity to ﬁnancial
markets on a permanent basis may have an inﬂationary bias in the long run.
Appendix
Stock Market Data
Data on individual ﬁrms’ returns are from the PACAP (Paciﬁc Capital
Markets) database. For each share in our sample, we use daily returns with-
out dividends reinvested (PACAP mnemonic: DRETND) and trading val-
ues (TRDVAL). Daily returns are daily equally weighted market returns
without cash dividends reinvested (DERMND). We also use (TRDVAL)
monthly data on trading values and market capitalization (MKTCAP).
We also use a PACAP monthly return, which is monthly equally weighted
market returns without cash dividends reinvested (MERMND). Turnover
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8. The intermediary functions of the money market declined at the extremely low interest
rate. With the quantitative easing policy, ﬁnancial institutions—including banks, securities
companies, and securities ﬁnance companies—have accumulated rapidly current account
balances with the Bank of Japan. Despite the resulting large increases in monetary base, how-
ever, ﬁnancial intermediation was not revived because ﬁnancial institutions built up the un-
precedented level of excess reserves (see Hetzel 2004).and market capitalization in the stocks in the Tokyo Stock Exchange Topix
Index are from CEIC DRI Asia Database.
Cross-Sectional Data
To construct cross-sectional data on ﬁrms, we use data from a PACAP
database on balance sheets that contains our main measure of ﬁrm size 
and normalization variable on Total Assets (PACAP mnemonic: BAL22).
Short-term loans to asset ratio is the sum of accounts and notes payable
(BAL10) and short-term loans (BAL11) divided by total assets. Other lia-
bilities to asset ratiois total liabilities (BAL17) divided by total assets minus
short-term loans to asset ratio. We measure liquid assets to assets ratio is the
sum of cash (BAL1) and marketable securities (BAL2) divided by total as-
sets. Financial to book value is the sum of total liabilities and the product of
number of shares of common stock (MKT5) and share price (MKT3) di-
vided by total assets. Return on equityis net income (INC9) divided by total
shareholder’s equity (BAL21). We construct percentage of stocks held by
banks or corporate sectoras the number of shares owned by government and
local government (JAF75) plus the number of shares owned by ﬁnancial in-
stitutions (JAF76) plus the number of shares owned by other business cor-
porations (JAF78) divided by total shares owned (JAF81). We also measure
growth in net ﬁxed assets (BAL7) and sales (INC1).
Industry-level dummy variables are also created to match the industries
in table 8A.1.
Time-Series Data
Time-series data are obtained from the OECD Main Economics Indi-
cators.
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Table 8A.1
Agriculture and forestry 1 Nonferrous metals 20
Air transportation 3 Other manufacturing 24
Chemicals 107 Petroleum 6
Communications 1 Precision equipment 18
Construction 75 Pulp and paper 12
Electric machinery 99 Real estate 15
Electric power and gas 14 Retail 39
Financial (non bank & securities) 10 Rubber 8
Fishery 5 Services 22
Foods 51 Shipping 8
Glass and ceramics 21 Textiles 34
Iron and steel 30 Transportation equipment 56
Land transportation 22 Warehousing and wharﬁng 7
Machinery 56 Wholesale 43
Metal products 13 Total 828
Mining 8topix: The Tokyo Stock Exchange Topix Index
cpi: CPI Services Less Housing (1995   100)
m2: M2 plus CD (trillions of yen, seasonally adjusted)
Additional data are obtained from the CEIC DRI Asia database.
MB: Monetary Base (monthly average, billions of yen, seasonally ad-
justed with X-12)
y: All Industry Activity Index (1995  100, seasonally adjusted with X-12)
call: Uncollateralized Overnight Rate (%)
References
Ahn, Hee-Joon, Jun Cai, Yasushi Hamao, and Richard Y. K. Ho. 2002. The com-
ponents of the bid-ask spread in a limit-order market: Evidence from the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. Journal of Empirical Finance 9 (November): 399–430.
Almeida, Heitor, Murillo Campello, and Michael S. Weisbach. 2004. The cash ﬂow
sensitivity of cash. Journal of Finance 59 (August): 1777–804.
Amihud, Yakov, and Haim Mendelson. 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread.
Journal of Financial Economics 17 (December): 223–49.
Bank of Japan. 2002. Principal terms and conditions pertaining to the purchase of
bills. Bank of Japan. Mimeo.
Bayoumi, Tamim. 2001. The morning after: Explaining the slowdown in Japanese
growth in the 1990s. Journal of International Economics 53 (April): 241–59.
Campbell, John Y., Sanford J. Grossman, and Jiang Wang. 1993. Trading volume
and serial correlation in stock returns. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (No-
vember): 905–39.
Chao, Chaoshin, and C. James Hueng. Forthcoming. Over-reaction eﬀects inde-
pendent of risk and characteristics: Evidence from the Japanese Stock Market.
Journal of Japan and the World Economy, forthcoming.
Choi, Woon Gyu, and Yungsan Kim. 2001. Monetary policy and corporate liquid
asset demand. IMF Working Paper no. WP/01/177 Washington, DC: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, November.
Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 2002. Order im-
balance, liquidity, and market returns. Journal of Financial Economics 65 (July):
111–30.
Chordia, Tarun, Asani Sarkar, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 2002. An empirical
analysis of stock and bond market liquidity. Emory University Working Paper.
Forbes, Kristin. 2000. The Asian ﬂu and Russian virus: Firm-level evidence on how
crises are transmitted internationally. NBER Working Paper no. 7807. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July.
Hamao, Yasushi, Jianping Mei, and Yexiao Xu. 2003. Idiosyncratic risk and the
creative destruction in Japan. NBER Working Paper no. 9642. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, April.
Hetzel, Robert L. 2004. Price stability and Japanese monetary policy. IMES Dis-
cussion Paper No. 2004-E-6. Tokyo, Japan: Institute for Monetary and Eco-
nomic Studies, Bank of Japan.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Kenneth N. Kuttner, and Darius N. Palia. 2002. Are there
bank eﬀects in borrowers’ costs of funds? Evidence from a matched sample of
borrowers and banks. Journal of Business 75 (October): 559–81.
334 Woon Gyu Choi and David CookIto, Takatoshi. 1994. The Japanese economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ito, Takatoshi, and Kimie Harada. 2000. Japan premium and stock prices: Two
mirrors of Japanese banking crises. NBER Working Paper no. 7997. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore. 2001. Liquidity, business cycles and mone-
tary policy. London School of Economics. Mimeo.
Lerner, Josh, and Antoinette Schoar. 2004. The illiquidity puzzle: Theory and evi-
dence from private equity. Journal of Financial Economics (April): 3–40.
Miyao, Ryuzo. 1996. Does a co-integrating M2 demand relation really exist in
Japan? Journal of Japan and the International Economies 10 (June): 169–80.
———. 2002. The eﬀects of monetary policy in Japan. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 34 (May): 376–92.
Nagayasu, Jun. 2003. A re-examination of the Japanese money demand function
and structural shifts. Journal of Policy Modeling 25 (June): 359–75.
Opler, Tim C., Lee Pinkowitz, Rene Stultz, and Rohan Williamson. 1999. The de-
terminants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial
Economics 52 (April): 3–46.
Pastor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock
returns. Journal of Political Economy 111 (June): 642–85.
Persaud, Avinash. 2000. Sending the herd oﬀ the cliﬀ edge: The disturbing inter-
action between herding and market-sensitive risk management practices. State
Street. Mimeo.
Sekine, T. 1998. Financial liberalization, the wealth eﬀect, and the demand for
broad money in Japan. Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies16 (May):
35–55.
Stahel, Christof W. 2004. Is there a global liquidity factor? Ohio State University.
Mimeo.
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 2003. Tokyo Stock Exchange Handbook 2003. Tokyo.
Ueda, Kazuo. 1993. A comparative perspective on Japanese monetary policy: Short-
run monetary control and the transmission mechanism. In Japanese monetary pol-
icy, ed. Kenneth J. Singleton, 7–30. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wang, Ashley W. 2003. Institutional equity ﬂows, liquidity risk and asset pricing.
University of California, Los Angeles. Mimeo.
Comment Shin-ichi Fukuda
This chapter investigates what impacts liquidity shocks had on micro and
macroeconomy in Japan during the past decade. It has three major ﬁnd-
ings: (a) empirical evidence on liquidity shocks of Japanese stock markets
based on daily data, (b) microevidence on the liquidity based on the ﬁrm-
level data, and (c) macroevidence based on time-series data. All of them are
valuable empirical studies.
Empirical Evidence on Liquidity Shocks Based on Daily Data
The ﬁrst important contribution of this chapter is on empirical evidence
on liquidity shocks of Japanese stock markets. There are several previous
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Shin-ichi Fukuda is a professor of economics at the University of Tokyo.studies that tried to measure the liquidity of stock markets. But there are
relatively few for Japanese stock markets. The analytical method follows
Pastor and Stambaugh (JPE 2003). It estimates the parameter that mea-
sures the degree to which sales aﬀect expected returns, and supposes that
the parameter measures “liquidity.” The intuition is that “order ﬂow”
should be accompanied by a return that one expects to be partially reversed
in the future if the stock is not perfectly liquid. The greater the expected re-
versal for a given dollar volume, the lower the stock’s liquidity.
By using the data of Japanese stock markets in the post-bubble period,
the authors ﬁnd steep drops in the liquidity and steep rises in liquidity risk.
There was a clear-cut relationship between liquidity shocks and stock re-
turns. In particular, most of liquidity shocks occurred during market down-
turns. The results are very reasonable. However, as for the relationship be-
tween liquidity shocks and stock returns, their causality is not clear.
The chapter reports three subperiods that had steep drops in the liquid-
ity and steep rises in liquidity risk: 1991–1992 (the period after the crush of
the bubbles), 1997–1998 (the period of banking crisis in Japan), and 2000–
2002 (the deﬂation period). Liquidity shocks might have caused the mar-
ket downturns during these periods. It is, however, possible that the mar-
ket downturns in turn caused liquidity shocks during these periods. To
identify the causality, we need to check which events caused the “liquidity
shocks” observed in the chapter. Checking which events caused some
spikes of the “liquidity shocks” may verify the causality.
Microevidence on the Liquidity Based on the Firm-Level Data
The second important contribution of this chapter is on microevidence
on the liquidity shocks based on the ﬁrm-level data in Japan. In previous
literature, Hasbrouck and Seppi (JFE 2001) ﬁnd that idiosyncratic liquid-
ity strongly dominates the common liquidity factor in explaining returns
by using the Dow Jones Index. But few previous studies explored how
cross-sectional variations of “liquidity” are related to ﬁrms’ characteris-
tics, such as their balance sheets. The chapter thus clearly provides a new
empirical evidence by using the microdata in Japan from 1995 to 2001.
The chapter reports various cross-sectional variations of “liquidity” in
Japanese stock markets. In particular, it showed that ﬁrms with high expo-
sures to liquidity shocks are those whose balance sheets are illiquid, that is,
high short-term debt–asset ratio and low liquid assets to asset ratio, and
that large ﬁrms (in terms of assets) have less exposure to liquidity shocks
than small ﬁrms. The ﬁndings are interesting. Their intuitive interpreta-
tions are, however, not necessarily straightforward.
The interpretations in the chapter are as follows. If a ﬁrm has more liq-
uid assets, it will be less exposed to liquidity shocks. Financially weak ﬁrms
will fear ﬁnancial strains caused by insuﬃcient reserves of liquidity. The in-
terpretations look similar to those of agency cost approaches. However,
336 Woon Gyu Choi and David Cook“liquidity” in the chapter is “liquidity” for investors in the stock markets.
The “liquidity” in the stock markets is diﬀerent from “liquidity” of ﬁrms’
balance sheets. We thus need a new story to explain why “liquidity” in the
stock markets is so related to “liquidity” of ﬁrms’ balance sheets.
“Liquidity” in the stock markets is liquidity for outside investors. We
thus need to explain why those investors could not diversify idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks. My interpretations of the results are as follows. “Liquid-
ity” in the stock markets may be related with some default risk of ﬁrms. The
stocks become more illiquid for the ﬁrms that have higher default risk. De-
fault risk varies across ﬁrms. Firms whose balance sheets are illiquid (that
is, ﬁrms with high short-term debt–asset ratios and small liquid assets)
tend to face larger default risk. Large ﬁrms face smaller default risk than
small ﬁrms. The interpretations seem consistent with empirical results in
the chapter. But if this is the case, default risk rather than “liquidity” in the
stock markets is the ultimate source that explains cross-sectional variations
of “liquidity.” The implications will be diﬀerent.
On microevidence on the liquidity based on the ﬁrm-level data, the chap-
ter provides other interesting ﬁndings: (a) Firms that have high liquidity
exposure have slower capital investment; (b) Liquidity exposure is also an
important determinant of sales growth. But in explaining capital invest-
ment, some important variables such as Tobin’s qand proﬁts are missing in
the regressions. Thus, their interpretations may not be easy. There are two
types of liquidity: (a) “liquidity” in the stock markets that reﬂect liquidity
for outside investors and (b) “liquidity” of ﬁrms’ balance sheets. The re-
sults seem to suggest that the ﬁrst type is much more important than the
second type for capital investment. They suggest that in Japan, there was
no credit constraint in the sense of traditional agency cost approaches.
However, it contradicts a large number of studies that support the impor-
tance of the second type of liquidity for capital investment. Liquidity ex-
posure to the ﬁrst type is highly correlated with that to the second. The re-
gression has some missing variables and some measurement errors because
it uses book values in the balance sheet rather than market values. It is very
diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀects of two types, although the regressions in-
clude proxies for both types of liquidity exposure.
Macroevidence on the Eﬀects of Liquidity Shocks 
Based on Time-Series Data
The third important contribution of this chapter is on macro time-series
evidence on the eﬀects of liquidity shocks based on VARs. Several previous
studies investigated how the liquidity measures of stock markets aﬀect sev-
eral variables in the stock markets. But there are few studies that investi-
gated how the liquidity measures of stock markets aﬀect macrovariables.
The paper provides the times-series analysis (that is, VARs and impulse-
response functions) based on monthly (and quarterly) macrodata. The
Stock Market Liquidity and the Macroeconomy 337sample period is from 1990 to 2001. It shows that liquidity shocks have sig-
niﬁcant impacts not only on stock returns, but also on various macrovari-
ables and monetary variables. On the impacts of a negative liquidity shock
on macrovariables, it ﬁnds negative impacts on CPI, positive impacts on
unemployment rate, negative but insigniﬁcant impacts on IIP, and negative
impacts on changes of business investment. Except for IIP, the impacts are
large and persistent. But the impacts seem to be too big and too persistent.
For example, liquidity shocks explain 25 percent of the variation in CPI
and unemployment rate. It is hard to believe that the shocks can explain
such a large proportion of variations.
Why did we have such big impacts of liquidity shocks on macro and
monetary variables? A possible reason is that only limited variables are in-
cluded in VARs. If some key variables are missing, the third factors may
cause spurious impacts of liquidity shocks on macro and monetary vari-
ables. In particular, many of the macro and monetary variables have some
sluggishness. Even after exogenous shocks occurred, these variables take
time to adjust. Stock prices and liquidity shocks, in contrast, respond to
the exogenous shocks almost instantaneously. If this is the case, liquidity
shocks can cause macro and monetary variables in the sense of Granger.
But it does not necessarily mean that liquidity shocks aﬀect macro and
monetary variables.
What Policy Implications?
Overall, the chapter provides various interesting empirical ﬁndings.
These ﬁndings imply that liquidity exposure is an important source of eco-
nomic downturns in Japan. The results deserve publication by themselves.
But the chapter’s policy implications are not necessarily clear. Could Japan
improve macro- and micro-level economic downturns by eliminating liq-
uidity exposure? If yes, how?
In the paper, illiquid balance sheets of the ﬁrms explain a part of micro-
level liquidity shocks. But its explanatory power was very small (that is, R2
was 0.16). In conclusion, the chapter seems to suggest that lowering inter-
est rates can eliminate macrolevel liquidity exposure. But the impulse-
response functions show almost negligible impacts from monetary shocks
to liquidity shocks. At least the present version of the chapter did not ex-
plain major sources of highly illiquid equity markets during the recent de-
ﬂationary period. The ultimate source of economic downturns in Japan
seems to be left unexplained in the chapter.
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This chapter ﬁrst applies a method proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) to daily Japanese stock data, and constructs the time-series of de-
grees of market liquidity as state variables for asset pricing. Then, using
this measure of market liquidity, it estimates liquidity betas, or risks asso-
ciated with changes in market liquidity for individual stocks. In addition,
the authors conduct a cross-sectional analysis of eﬀects of these estimated
liquidity betas on performances of ﬁrms, as well as a time-series analysis of
eﬀects of aggregate market liquidity on macroeconomic variables.
Major ﬁndings of this chapter are summarized as follows. First, stock
markets were extremely illiquid during the late 1990s. Second, ﬁrms with
liquid balance sheets carried relatively low liquidity risks. Third, high liq-
uidity risks were associated with low performances of ﬁrms. Fourth, ag-
gregate liquidity measures served as a leading indicator for major aggre-
gate variables such as output, investment, and employment.
Before commenting on this chapter, I would like to make a quick review of
a method proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). They identify order-
induced one-day return reversals as market impacts from individual stock
data, and construct an aggregate liquidity measure by averaging such mar-
ket impacts over individual return reversals. Then, they estimate an individ-
ual liquidity beta by checking whether innovations on the above-constructed
liquidity measures are priced for equity premiums of individual stocks.
To my best knowledge, this chapter is the ﬁrst serious application of Pas-
tor and Stambaugh (2003) to Japanese stock data. Sincere readers of this
chapter might be intellectually curious to know how innovations in aggre-
gate liquidity are priced in Japanese stock markets in comparison with U.S.
stock markets. In this regard, reporting detailed information as to the esti-
mated liquidity betas would be appreciated greatly by such readers.
I would like to discuss this chapter in two respects. My ﬁrst comment
concerns a theoretical relationship between aggregate liquidity in stock
markets and macroeconomic variables. This paper well documents that
negative shocks on aggregate liquidity measures are followed by declines
in macroeconomic activities. Then, one may want to ask which theoretical
hypothesis may explain such a relationship between them. As mentioned
above, Pastor and Stambaugh’s liquidity measures are based on high-
frequency phenomena such as one-day return reversals. In other words, the
construction of this liquidity measure implicitly assumes that pricing dis-
tortion is ﬁxed at least partially within one business day. With due consid-
eration for this aspect, it would be rather hard to imagine that such high-
frequency frictions themselves have direct and substantial impacts on
macroeconomic activities.
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shock which drives both illiquidity of stock markets and economic slow-
down. For example, due to downward revisions in expectations about eco-
nomic fundamentals among market participants, stock markets would
become seller-dominated, and market liquidity would be deteriorated to a
large extent. Circumstantial evidence for this story is that during the ﬁ-
nancial crises in both 1997 and 1998, not only stock markets, but also other
markets serving for corporate ﬁnancing, were extremely illiquid.
My second comment regards responses of monetary policy to illiquid
ﬁnancial markets, which may have something to do with issues broadly
raised by this conference. I still believe that a monetary policy is quite im-
portant in terms of maintaining orderly ﬁnancial markets, though not con-
trolling business cycles, when ﬁnancial markets are extremely illiquid dur-
ing ﬁnancial crises. One important question is how a central bank should
behave in order to recover market liquidity. Which ﬁnancial market should
the bank target? Which policy instrument should it adopt?
During a ﬁnancial crisis, liquidity often shifts from stock markets or
corporate bond markets, to money markets or government-bond markets.
In particular, there may emerge extremely strong demand for short-run
government-issued bonds. In such a case, the open-purchase operations in
which a central bank provides liquidity to commercial banks that are ma-
jor market makers at money markets, would not be as eﬀective as they are
in normal market conditions. Through monetary operations, the Bank of
Japan might just yield an additional demand for money market instru-
ments in competition with other private players.
One possible eﬀective operation may be to provide liquidity to security
companies and investment banks that are major market makers at stocks
and corporate bonds, or even more directly to large investors that hold
long positions in stock markets by carrying short positions in money mar-
kets. A central bank’s direct purchase of corporate stocks may be an alter-
native choice. Given the authors’ empirical ﬁnding that stock markets were
extremely illiquid during the ﬁnancial crises in the late 1990s, discussing
possible policy measures to recover market liquidity in more detail would
enhance the value of this chapter substantially.
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